Going beyond statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court in other cases applied the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the fourteenth Amendment and the due-process of the Fifth Amendment, respectively, tostrike down state and federal laws that rested on gender classification found to be injurious to women.
超越法律解釋，最高法院在其他一些案子里，分別運用了第14修正案中的“適當(dāng)程序”和 “平等保護(hù)”條款和第5修正案的 “適當(dāng)程序”條款，槍斃了一些傷害婦女的、建立在性別分類基礎(chǔ)上的州和聯(lián)邦法律。
The leading case in this line of decisions was Reed v. Reed (1971). Here the Court upheld the claim of an Idaho woman that a state court’s appointment of her estranged husband as the administrator of their deceased child’s estate, in accordance with an Idaho law that categorically favored men over women in matters of this sort, was a denial of equal protection 初中地理 of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
這一系列司法裁定中的首要案例是對里德控里德（1971年）一案的裁定。 在此案中，最高法院支持愛達(dá)荷州一位婦女的要求。她聲稱，該州法院指定與她分居的丈夫作為他們已故孩子的遺產(chǎn)管理人。這一指定是根據(jù)該州在此類案件中直截了當(dāng)?shù)仄蚰行远桥缘囊粭l法律，最高法院認(rèn)為這條法律背棄了第14條修正案中法律的平等保護(hù)條款。
In Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), the Burger justices declared a federal law unconstitutional as a violation of the equal-protection requirement. The law in question regarded the dependents of male military personnel as automatically entitled to a basic subsistence allowance, but required the dependents of female military personnel to prove their actual dependency before they could qualify for an allowance.
在佛朗提爾控對理查德森一案(1973年)中，博格法院的法官們宣布一條聯(lián)邦法律違憲，因為它違反了平等保護(hù)的要求。受到質(zhì)疑的這條法律，認(rèn)為男性軍職人員的被撫養(yǎng)人可自動獲得基本補助金，但要求女性軍職人員的被撫養(yǎng)人必須先證明被撫養(yǎng)關(guān)系的真實性, 才有資格獲得這筆補助金。
The Court further struck down a Utah statute that required divorced fathers to support their sons until age twenty-one, but their daughters only until age eighteen；and a Louisiana law that excluded women from jury duty unless they volunteered for it.
最高法院進(jìn)一步否決了猶他州的一個法律，該法令要求離婚的父親資助兒子到21歲，但要求資助女兒只到18歲；它還槍斃了路易斯安那州剝奪婦女擔(dān)任陪審員的義務(wù)、除非她們出于自愿的一條法律。
In employment matters the Court held that states could not force pregnant women to take maternity sick leave at a specified time on the ground that such a policy violated the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although states and private employers could deny disability insurance benefits to women undergoing normal pregnancy and childbirth, they could not deny women employees’ unemployment compensation benefits when they stopped working because of pregnancy.
在就業(yè)問題上，最高法院認(rèn)為各州不得強迫孕婦在特定時段請產(chǎn)假，因為法院認(rèn)為這樣的政策違反了第14條修正案的“適當(dāng)程序”條款。雖然州和私人雇主可以拒發(fā)處于正常懷孕和生育階段婦女的殘疾保險福利，但不得拒發(fā)因懷孕而中止工作的女雇員的失業(yè)補償金。
In gender discrimination cases the Supreme Court in the 1980s continued to hand down decisions favorable to women’s claim to equality. For example, the Court upheld a state antidiscrimination law that required women to be admitted to an all-male leadership training organization, against a claim that the law violated First Amendment rights of free association. In Meritor Savings Bank v.Vinson (1986), the Court for the first time applied Title VII to a claim of sexual harassment; it accepted the concepts of “hostile environment” and “quid pro quo” interaction as definitions of harassment.
在20世紀(jì)80年代有關(guān)性別歧視的案子中，最高法院繼續(xù)宣布支持婦女對平等要求的裁定。例如，某州的反歧視法要求準(zhǔn)許女性進(jìn)入完全為男性開辦的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)培訓(xùn)組織，針對認(rèn)為該法案違反了第一修正案中自由結(jié)社的指控，最高法院支持了上述的州反歧視法。在美里特儲蓄銀行控文森一案中，法院首次將第七款運用到對“性騷擾”的投訴。法院接受了“具有敵意的環(huán)境”和“交換 ”互動作用的概念，把它們作為“騷擾”的定義。
As in the death penalty case, the Burger Court manifested moderate reform tendencies on the abortion question, a controversial social issue throughout the 1970s. In a case of 1973, it struck down a Texas law that made abortion a criminal offense, on the ground that the law violated a woman’s constitutional right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion stimulated that in the first and second trimesters of pregnancy the state’s power to regulate abortion was either nonexistent or subordinate to the woman’s right to decide the question of death or abortion. Only in the third trimester might the state prohibit abortion outright, and even then it could not prohibit abortion to save the life or health of the mother. In another case of the same year, relying on the same ground of invasion of privacy, the Court invalidated the recent Georgia law that made abortion crime.
墮胎問題是貫穿于20世紀(jì)70年代的頗有爭議的社會問題。正如在死刑案子中，博格法院在“墮胎問題”中顯露出溫和的改革傾向。在 1973年的一個案子中，最高法院槍斃了德克薩斯州把墮胎定為刑事罪的法律，理由是該法違反了第14修正案中憲法保證的婦女隱私權(quán)。伯萊克芒法官代表的多數(shù)意見認(rèn)為：在懷孕的第一和第二妊娠期，要么州沒有規(guī)定墮胎的權(quán)力，要么應(yīng)服從婦女對死亡和墮胎的決定權(quán)。僅僅在第三妊娠期，州才可以完全禁止墮胎，但即使在這個階段，州也不可禁止出于保護(hù)母親生命和健康目的實行的墮胎。在1973年的另一個案子里，同樣以侵犯隱私權(quán)為由，最高法院宣布當(dāng)時佐治亞州把墮胎定為刑事犯罪的法律無效。
歷史理解要點：
雖然美國第19條修正案最終做出婦女在選舉權(quán)上不得受性別歧視的保證，但在20世紀(jì)60年代以前，各種形式的性別歧視繼續(xù)限制著社會生活中的女性。
從20世紀(jì)七八十年代起， 美國最高法院，特別是博格法院任期內(nèi)，更多地限制男性以保護(hù)女性， 宣布了一系列有利于婦女的反性別歧視的裁定，使婦女在美國社會中，特別在就業(yè)、生育、墮胎、人生安全和社會福利等方面的平等權(quán)利得到法律保護(hù)。
本文來自：逍遙右腦記憶 http://www.yy-art.cn/chuzhong/50379.html
相關(guān)閱讀：先秦思想的人文精神